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Is China Building Africa?
By Zhengli Huang and Xiangming Chen

In this article, the authors address
the question “Is China Building
Africa?” by examining the true
nature of China’s infrastructure development projects in Africa, and
how the different players involved
interact with each other.

“T

he US destroys and China
builds,” was how a taxi
driver from Ethiopia in
Washington DC responded to Chen’s
question about China’s main activity in
Africa. Building is what China has been
doing, on a massive scale, with projects
of all kinds sited in African cities and
spread across this vast continent. Having
built the $150 million gleaming new
conference centre at the headquarters
of the African Union in Addis Ababa,
China recently signed a contract worth
$12 billion to build the Coastal Railway
in Nigeria stretching 650 km across
the country from Calabar in the east to
Aba, Port Harcourt, Warri, Benin City
and Lagos in the west. Never before in
human history have we seen the spectacle of a continental-sized China, which
was as poor as most African countries
only 30 years ago, building up Africa’s
infrastructure on such a scale that could
help the world’s poorest continent catch
up in development.
China’s dominant role in building
Africa’s infrastructure has been controversial despite two generally agreed positions. The first is that Africa lags severely
behind other developing regions in infrastructure and has a craving demand for
catching up. The second is that China

is meeting that demand more than any
other country, with its companies, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
and workers labouring away on projects
that range from municipal buildings and
dams to roads and railways that begin to
stitch together poorly connected African
cities and regions.
State-led economic development and
infrastructure provision in China often
implies that its central government can
extend its experience in shaping the
scale and speed of infrastructure development in Africa.1 Some even suggest
that China is exporting its infrastructure production as a political leverage
in Africa. However, Huang’s experience
working with Chinese SOEs in Nairobi

and other places in Africa leads us to
make an alternative argument backed
by evidence marshalled in this article.
Chinese SOEs are generally misconceived as political allies with the central
government, while their corporative
nature with a profit orientation and
financial constraints is largely overlooked. This bias tends to inflate the
political rhetoric of China building Africa.
We question “Is China Building
Africa” by probing the hidden interface between the strategic and pragmatic levels of China’s involvement in
Africa’s infrastructure development. We
do so by examining: 1) how the political
rhetoric is translated into any practical
strategies; 2) how the different players,
including the government representatives of China, the Export-Import
Bank of China (EximBank), the subsidiaries of the SOEs in Africa, as well
as the local authorities and agencies,
interact with one another in initiating
and executing infrastructure projects,
and 3) the benefits and risks for the
various parties now and into the future

Figure 1. China’s Share in Africa’s Construction Market³
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Figure 2. China’s Top Contractors’ Turnovers in Various Overseas Markets⁵
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Figure 3. China’s Growing But Still Limited Share in Financing Africa’s Infrastructure
Relative to the Other Sources⁷
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of Africa’s infrastructure development.
Dominating the African
Infrastructure Market
China plays the most important external role in Africa’s infrastructure construction, as the largest contracting
nation in Africa. Europe used to be
Africa’s largest contractor, accounting
for 44.3% of the region’s total market
revenue in 2002, but its share declined
to 34.6% in 2011. The market share of
US contractors dropped even more,
from 24.1% in 2002 to 6.7% in 2011. In
contrast, the market share of Chinese
companies rose sharply from 9.9%
in 2002 to 40.1% in 2011, and has remained fairly stable2 (see Figure 1 on
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previous page).
From a related perspective, Africa
has become China’s largest market in
its overall overseas contracting work.
In 2008, Africa grew to account for
almost half of China’s overseas construction markets, surpassing Asia
(32%) for the first time in history (see
Figure 2 above).4
The data in Figure 2 refer to the
projects commissioned to Chinese
SOEs by customers in the African
countries, usually their national governments. When it comes to the financing of African infrastructure,
China’s involvement is quite different.
While China is the largest funder of
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African infrastructure as a national government,6 its financing is more
limited than other funding sources (see
Figure 3 on left), especially in comparison with its dominant role in project
contracting and construction.
It is important to distinguish the
roles and responsibilities of Chinese
entities in financing vs. building Africa’s
infrastructure projects that carry varied
short- and long-term benefits and risks.
There are two distinctive dimensions
to Chinese entities building in Africa.
The China-funding aspect refers to the
projects where Chinese entities, usually
the EximBank, occasionally the SOEs
themselves, play a major role in funding
the projects. They could potentially
become a shareholder in such projects, which are not necessarily built by
Chinese contractors, although the latter
are involved in most cases. Second, the
China-contracted projects are those that
are built by Chinese enterprises, mostly
SOEs, but not necessarily funded by the
Chinese government.
The data above reveal the different
levels of China’s involvement in contracting and financing African infrastructure development. It is clear that
China is more of a contractor and
builder than a financier. Whilst China
is building the majority of infrastructure projects in Africa, the financing
of these projects often comes from
sources other than Chinese banks, and
companies themselves (see Figure 4 on
next page).
Silent Builders and Limited Influence
In revealing the disparity between
China’s financing and building roles in
Africa’s infrastructure, we highlight a
complex environment in which many
Chinese SOEs are limited to a marginal position, even though they are
the contractors and builders of most
infrastructure projects. This environment features multiple sources of

financing that both facilitate and inhibit
China’s extensive presence and influence in Africa’s infrastructure sector.
As suggested by the most recent ICA
report (2014),8 the largest investment
in infrastructure in Africa comes from
the African governments themselves.
Normally this is enhanced by external
financial sources, the largest being ICA
funding, that mainly include the OECD
countries and regional banks such as the
World Bank and African Development
Bank (AfDB). A typical financing structure and flow is illustrated in Figure 5.
In this scheme, when Chinese entities participate as contractors, their responsibility is to “build the project to
specification on time.”10 The Chinese
contractors sometimes complain that
they are at the bottom of the supply
chain. Not only do they have to face
the challenge of cost control, but they
are also positioned at the frontline of
social and political clashes, a challenge
they are not equipped to address. On
some occasions, conflict in landownership may halt a project. In Kenya,
Nigeria, Angola and elsewhere, there
have been projects cancelled in the
middle of construction, causing tremendous loss to both the host country
and the Chinese contractors.11
Given the Chinese enterprises’ stateowned nature, they are likely to be seen
as more politically oriented. In principle,
Chinese SOEs have been ‘modernised’
since the Company Law was passed in
1993, and are supposed to follow international corporative practices, through
the separation of ownership and control.
In reality, the central government continues to influence SOEs mainly through
two mechanisms: the de facto shareholder of State Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC)
and the Personnel Appointment System.12
For the subsidiaries of SOEs operating
in Africa, decision-making is naturally
decentralised and largely localised, which

Figure 4. The Disparity Between China’s Shares in Financing vs. Building Africa’s
Infrastructure (Based on data from ENR and ICA)
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Figure 5. The Typical African Project Finance Structure⁹
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limits the leverage of SASAC.
The subsidiaries in Africa are not
very popular among their mother
SOEs’ employees. This leads to a shortterm human resources management
system. Junior managers would normally work in an overseas subsidiary for 2-4
years, before being transferred back to
China. The relatively short assignment
makes them focus on near-term targets,
such as maximising the number of contracts signed and the turnover of projects, which are regarded as benchmarks
for their promotion and subsequent

transfers, while the long-term benefits
and sustainability of projects are neglected or even sacrificed.
Besides this term-based personnel
system, there is a lack of long-term
strategies from the Chinese government or the SOEs to exert any positive social impact through these infrastructure projects. This is also why the
Chinese SOEs are usually observed as
being segregated from the African cities
and places where they operate. The capacity of Chinese contractors’ communication with locals is lacking partly
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Figure 6. A Triangular Structure of Key Chinese and African Stakeholders in the
“Two Preferential Loan Programs”
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due to the labour management system
in Africa. Most of the SOE employees
in Africa are manual workers. In 2011,
China sent 452,000 workers abroad, of
which 243,000 were engaged in construction work, accounting for 53.8%
of the total.13 This has created some
misunderstanding, distrust and even
antagonism from the host countries.
To be fair, on most construction sites
in Africa, the majority of the labour
force turns out to be local. But since
infrastructure construction is labour-intensive and there is a chronic shortage
of skilled labour in the local market, it
is not surprising that a large number
of construction workers are sent from
China. According to a recent study by
Ethics Institute of South Africa, 55%
of the interviewees had the impression
that Chinese companies in Africa were
hiring Chinese employees only. This is
neither true nor practical. As reported
by China Daily in 2011, at China Roads
and Bridges Corporation (CRBC), the
ratio of Chinese to local employees was
around 1 to 15, with our caveat that
this may not be representative of most
China-built infrastructure projects.
The Chinese government has a policy
of encouraging all SOEs to “Go Out” to
Africa. While this policy may or may not
be politically motivated, Chinese SOEs

face serious challenges in following this
policy, let alone being able to fulfill any
political agenda behind the policy. The
entry of many SOEs into Africa’s infrastructure sector creates severe competition among themselves, often leading
to price wars and underhanded or shady
practices. As revealed by a senate debate
in Kenya, during a bid for C13 highway
construction, of the ten companies who
submitted their bids, five were from
China. Not surprisingly, the lowest price
offer came from one of the five Chinese
companies, Jiangxi International Ltd,
which was a well-established enterprise
in East Africa and also building a few
important projects in Nairobi. To be
more specific, while the officially estimated cost for the project was 5.2
billion Kenyan shilling (ca. $64 million),
the bids from the Chinese competitors
were 3.8 by Jiangxi International, 4.5 by
China Wu Yi, 4.5 by China Railway No.
5 Engineering Group, 4.8 by Shengli
Engineering 4.8 and 5.0 by Sino Hydro.
In comparison, a local construction
firm with equivalent size and experience
quoted 5.2 billion and Hayer Bishan
Singh & Sons, an Indian company,
offered 6.0.15 This is not rare in Africa.
In a recent bid for an infrastructure
project in Angola, there were 13 Chinese
companies out of 21 bidders.
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Generally speaking, there is lack of
a strategic plan for many Chinese contractors to act as truly market actors
in the distant and unfamiliar African
market. While the increasingly competitive and saturated domestic infrastructure market in China pushes more SOE
builders to go to Africa, many of them
failed to develop a long-term strategy to
take advantage of the market potential
in Africa.
The China-Africa Triangle
Although Chinese SOEs have not developed a very effective long-term strategy
for Africa’s infrastructure market, the
Chinese government found it critical to
grow and diversify financing in Africa.
Its main financing channels include
grants, zero or low interest loans, and
preferential export credits.16 Among
them, the concessional loans and
preferential export credits are the two
main tools used by China EximBank,
and called “the Two Preferential Loan
Programs” (Liangyou). Figure 6 (see
figure 6 above) captures these practices through a triangular structure of the
agencies from the Chinese and African
sides and their basic procedural and operative interrelations.
Compared to a more detailed scheme
developed by Deborah Brautigam,17
our diagram left out several procedural
steps associated with government regulations. More importantly, the diagram
shows that the three actors have independent interests and functions in
implementing infrastructure projects,
and that each has the ability to initiate
a project and its financial flow between
the three parties. This way of visualising
a triangular structure aims to dispel the
illusion that the Chinese government
agencies and policy banks (MOFCOM
and the EximBank) always team up
with Chinese SOEs in dealing with their
counterpart – the African governments
and their agencies.

While the bilateral agreements
between the Chinese and African governments are the foundation for financing any project, they do not directly lead
to roads and bridges being built. In practice, African agencies can and may reach
out to a Chinese company when they
are aware of the connection between
the company and the EximBank or
MOFCOM that could ease the access
to the Two Preferential Loan Programs. On
the other hand, Chinese SOEs, when
bidding for projects in Africa, can use
the government financing support to
enhance their competitiveness against
non-Chinese bidders.
One important drawback built into
this framework is a lack of third party
evaluation and supervision of the financial flow between the three parties.
In financing from sources such as
the World Bank or JICA (Japanese
International Cooperation Agency), a
private or independent consultant team
would be hired to assess and monitor
the projects’ financial flow. In the
China-African Triangle, the feasibility
study usually is conducted by the SOE
that has won and will build the project,
supported by Chinese diplomatic officers in the embassies, evaluated by
permanent employees of the Bank,18
which usually leads to reporting that
discounts risks.
Another issue with this way of financing and building infrastructure
is the unfair and irrational concentration of risks. Once a loan is initiated,
the SOE building the project receives
regular payments directly from the
EximBank, which lowers the risk of no
profit for the contractor. It also shifts
the risk to be shared between the African
Government and the EximBank.
Considering that most of the infrastructure loans from the EximBank offer a
grace period of 5-10 years, the burden
for a borrowing African government is
significantly reduced. Since the electoral

system in most democratic countries in
Africa is a 3-4 year term, it is fair to say
that the government in power would
rather seize the financial resource for
now than being concerned about who
will pay back the principle plus interest
down the road. As a result, the risks for
potentially unpaid or defaulted loans
end up in the hands of the EximBank.
This explains why MOFCOM had to
limit the budget in funding Africa’s infrastructure to around 3% of the bank’s
profile,19 which might also account
for the drop of total investment from
China to African infrastructure in 2014
(see Figure 3).
The discussion above points to
the fundamental loophole of the
EximBank’s financing model for
African infrastructure: it’s not sustainable. The repayment of the loans
largely depends on external elements,
or lies in the hands of the local agencies. Even if the Chinese government
has any political ambition with the
loan as the vehicle for projecting soft
power, the other two players in the
triangle are much more short-termed
and opportunistic, which forestalls or
limits the adoption of a strategic and
sustainable approach to infrastructure

provision. As long as this triangular
system dominates the financing from
the Chinese government for Africa’s
infrastructure, the benefits from the
projects for all parties will be limited
overall and unevenly distributed.
The Japanese model
When it comes to inter-governmental
financial support for African infrastructure, or in terms of the ODA (Official
Development Assistance) methodology, the Japanese model can be used as
a comparison. China used Japan’s aid
system as a model in developing its
own foreign aid policies in the 1970s.20
But the Japanese model for financing
African infrastructure today (see Figure
7 below) stands as an alternative to the
Chinese approach.
The JBIC, the equivalent of the
EximBank, does not enforce any
ODA loans by itself. Instead, the
semi-government
agency
JICA
(Japanese International Cooperation
Agency), authorised by JBIC and the
central government, is in charge of
financing projects in Africa. By establishing a Special Purpose Company,
often times taking the form of a joint
venture with a local partner, JICA

Figure 7. The Japanese Way of Financing African Infrastructure
Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
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Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
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Chinese construction site, Ethiopia
Photo courtesy: SarahTz https://flic.kr/p/rmQRuf

would implement strategic planning at the project level. As
an effort to strengthen public-private partnerships, JICA
would initiate a call for bids from private partners in Japan
to carry out a feasibility study. The winner will then follow
the project implementation as an important stakeholder.
The hierarchical structure reflects a strong enforcement of
the Japanese government decisions. In addition, if we place
both the Chinese and the Japanese models into the framework
shown in Figure 5, the Japanese entities would be located on
the left side of the diagram and maintain a long-term interest
in a given project, while Chinese SOEs would remain on the
right hand side in pursuit of short-term profits.
Despite contributing a much smaller amount of investment to Africa’s infrastructure development than China,
Japan “has adeptly walked the fine line between assistance
and interference, … staffed by technical experts or the
Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, which is loosely
analogous to the US Peace Corps. Practicing the softest of
soft power, Japan became one of the largest but least visible
donors to Africa.”21 In Kenya alone, the bypasses in Nairobi
and a highway in Kisumu were designed and funded by JICA.
JICA also sent two expats to Nairobi’s city council to carry
out long-term research and the metropolitan plan of Nairobi,
the most recent and potentially the first implemented urban
plan after the 1948 British version for Nairobi.
Who Benefits and How?
There has been a rapid, sometimes explosive, expansion of
Chinese contractors into the African building market. It may
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look like a large-scale aggressive strategy of the Chinese government to exert political influence in Africa. However, our
analysis suggests that Chinese SOEs are mainly profit-driven in pursuing short-term economic goals, which tends to
produce a wide-ranging but shallow impact. While China’s
policy of encouraging its companies to ‘GO GLOBAL’ has
encouraged some SOEs to enter Africa’s infrastructure
sector, many have gone in to make quick money using their
experience and expertise in building low-cost standard infrastructure and taking advantage of the relatively easy access to
financing from international, African, and Chinese lenders.
Smaller than other sources of financing and its building role,
China’s financing through the EximBank and MOFCOM
has allowed SOEs to take some risks and reap decent profits.
At the same time, while unwilling to provide more financing
fearing the risk of instability in some African political regimes,
China’s state lenders have assumed some long-term risks of
certain African governments failing to pay back the low-interest loans. In these ways, the Chinese state has blended and
blurred with the increasingly market-oriented SOEs.
If China’s own development is any guide, physical infrastructure can play an important role in Africa’s economic development. However, it takes a long time to return on investment in transport infrastructure as the lagging demand from
faster economic growth catches up to the supply of newly
built roads and railways. In a shorter time horizon, African
local residents can benefit from the municipal infrastructure
projects such as stadiums, schools, hospitals and light rails
that China has also built. These immediate benefits for local
users however will not last for the long haul if the municipal
facilities are not properly operated and maintained. For China,
just building them in Africa is not good enough. Whether it
is a sign that China has moved beyond just building in Africa,
China has agreed to train over 100 operators for the light rail
system it has built in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
This encouraging example aside, much of China’s involvement in African infrastructure is limited to physical construction. In most projects built by Chinese SOEs, there are limited
contributions to local capacity building and technology transfer that will make the projects truly sustainable. Therefore,
there may be a justifiable criticism that while China has built
massive infrastructure across Africa, the lack of a longterm orientation and sustainable strategy has limited mutual
benefits for both the Chinese builders and African agencies and people. This concern gets further magnified when
some China-built infrastructure projects have displaced local
poor and incurred environmental contamination and health
hazards such as dumping excess oil in ditches and having
local workers remove it without protection.22

There may be a justifiable criticism that while China has built massive infrastructure
across Africa, the lack of a long-term orientation and sustainable strategy has limited
mutual benefits for both the Chinese builders and African countries and people.
In building Africa’s infrastructure,
is China signaling that its own development model based on infrastructure-induced industrialisation, which
has brought ‘miraculous’ economic
growth, could work or be replicated in Africa? If you built it in China,
they or the investors did come, in very
large numbers. But building infrastructure in Africa faces one fundamentally different constraint. In China, the
public ownership of urban land and
the aggressive conversion of rural
land from communal to public ownership, in conjunction with a powerful
developmentally-oriented state, has
allowed the government to quickly
build massive industrial (factory zones)
and transport (roads and railways) infrastructure on huge swathes of land
within, around, and between municipal boundaries. In Africa where land
ownership is mostly privatised, government is generally weak and economic development is primarily based
on an extensive informal sector, it is
an entirely different proposition and
process to secure large and connected
lands on which to build infrastructure.
As a result, before we can really assess
if and how the constructed infrastructure in Africa will lead to faster economic growth through more industrialisation, we need to figure out if China
is building Africa in a way that can be
financially stable, socially responsible,
environmentally sound, operationally
sustainable and bring other equitable
benefits for both sides.
*Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Eastern Sociological Society annual
meeting in Boston, March 17-21, 2016;
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Hartford, April 26, 2016. Helpful comments
from these audiences were acknowledged, but
we are responsible for any errors in facts and
interpretations that might be in this article.
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